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Performance And Corporate Governance May Provide The Impact Of Earnings Management With Tax Avoidance As An Intervening Variable

(Empirical study on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange)

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Abstract: *The purpose of this research is to analyse the influence of performance and corporate governance to earnings management with tax avoidance as an intervening variable. The samples were taken of the manufacturing companies listing on the IDX. This study design using quantitative methods, and testing hypotheses by using SEM with AMOS 2.4. The result is a significant direct effect of size and return on assets proxied with performance against earnings management with t-Statistics (3,983 and 2,418) is greater than t-table (1.96). Other result is a significant direct effect of independent commissioners and audit committees proxied with corporate governance against earnings management with t-Statistics (4,622 and 3,850) is greater than t-table. While the indirect effect, the results are no significant performance and CG against earnings management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable with t-Statistics (1,269) is greater than t-table. The implications are important for tax policy advisors, auditors, and stakeholders to be aware of the close relationship between performance and corporate governance with earnings management.*

1. Introduction

1.1. Background Research

Profit information is a key concern for assessing performance or management accountability (SFAC no.1). Profit information can help auditors, stakeholders and tax policy advisors in assessing earnings power of the company in the future. The tendency to pay more attention to this profit is realized by the management, especially managers whose performance is measured based on the earnings information, thus encouraging the emergence of deviant behaviour, which one form is earnings management [1-2].

Nariastiti (2014) Earnings management emerges as an impact of agency problems that occur due to the unconformity of interests between the owner and the management company. Manager behaviour in minimizing or maximizing corporate profits. Minimize profit for tax evasion legally, i.e. tax avoidance. Maximize profit to attract investors and make the stakeholders satisfied with the results of management work. Reported earnings are viewed as a primary measure of firm performance. Therefore, understanding the motivations and mechanisms behind earnings management has important implications in deriving informative summary measures of firm performance (Wang, et al, 2010) [3-5].

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Earnings management has become a corporate culture that is practiced in all companies in the world. Because this activity is not only in countries with business systems that have not been well ordered, but also done by companies in countries whose business systems have been well ordered, as does the United States. Even in some countries, the public doubts the integrity of the credibility of accountants who should be at the forefront of detecting earnings management and regulators who should prepare adequate regulation to create a clean and healthy business life (Sulistyanto, 2014) [6-10]. Tax avoidance is an attempt to reduce the tax burden by avoiding the tax by pointing to the transaction is not subject to tax (Pohan, 2016) [11-14]. Prakosa (2014) explains that tax avoidance is a tax evasion that is done legally because it does not violate the rules or standards that apply. However, tax avoidance can give big losses for the state because it reduces the income of the State Budge, so it can be said that tax avoidance is a legal action that harms the government. (Larastomo, 2016) [15].

Kurniasih & Sari (2013) states that one of the company's size shows the stability and ability of the company to conduct its economic activities. The larger the size of a company, the more it becomes the centre of attention from the government and will cause a tendency for the managers of the company to apply compliances or aggressive (tax avoidance) in taxation. Corporate governance shows the difference of interest between managers and owners of a company related to the state of good governance of a company with its tax decision making action. in the management of the corporate tax burden (Darmawan and Sukartha, 2014) [16-18].

Return on Assets (ROA) is an indicator that reflects the company's financial performance, the higher the value of ROA, the better the company's performance. ROA relates to the net income of the company and the imposition of income tax for the corporate taxpayer (Kurniasih & Sari, 2013). ROA has an effect on tax avoidance, because the sample company is able to manage its assets well so as to benefit from tax incentives and other tax breaks so the company looks to avoid taxes (Darmawan and Sukartha, 2014). Based

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on the above explanation the researcher conducted a study on **Performance and Corporate Governance to Earnings Management with Tax Avoidance as Intervening Variable** (Empirical study on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange) [19-20].

1.2. Problem formulation

To raise the issues discussed in this study, then the formulation of research problems as follows [21-28]:

a. How the influence of direct performance (size & ROA) and corporate governance (independent commissioners & audit committees) to earnings management?

b. What is the effect of tax avoidance on earnings management?

c. What is the effect of indirect performance (size & ROA) and corporate governance (independent commissioners & audit committees) through tax avoidance as an intervening variable?

2. Foundation Theory

2.1. Agency Theory

The agency theory illustrates that earnings management occurs as a result of different economic interests between management as agent and entity owner as principal. This difference in economic importance causes asymmetry (gap information) between shareholders (stakeholders) and the organization. (Gunawan, *et al*., 2015)

This condition is evident from the relationship of firm performance and corporate governance to earnings management. The agency relationship will continue to increase if the principal i*s* not able to monitor the activities of the agent to ensure that the agent works in accordance with the wishes of the principal.

2.2. Contingency Theory

According to Mikes (2014) states that the contingency theory is a theory that explains something that happens because of the relationship between each factor. These factors can be called antecedent and consequent. Contingency theory is the replacement for the response that is formulated to influence the relationship between antecedent and consequent, in other words, can be described as follows:

A = antecedent (Performance and Corporate Governance)

B = Condition (Tax Avoidance)

C = consequent (Earnings Management)

The relationship between A and C increased with B, a management strategy requires information that exists for exceptional conditions and limit the alternatives prepared. Contingency theory as the ultimate goal of achieving sustainability of the company (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2017). His relationship is often simpler and easier to understand and more elegant than the other theory. Simplicity and scope make contingency theory have a greater potential, the potential development of the company's tax avoidance.

2.3. Earnings Management

Tax-induced earnings management may be accountable for compensation contracts tied to accounting numbers. It may lead to lower performance evaluations and reduce promotion possibilities. Equity shareholders may also be adversely affected if the firm is unable to invest communiqués to financial analysts and other external investors (Healy & Palepu, 1993).

Prabowo (2014) states that earnings management is an act of intervention by management in an external financial reporting process that aims to self-benefit by influencing the company's profit rate. Nariastiti & Ratnadi (2014) state that profit management is a manager's behaviour in engaging or lowering profits to be submitted to company owners, by not increasing or lowering the company's long-term economic profitability. Earnings management is a condition in which management intervenes in financial statements for external parties so as to level, increase, and decrease profits (Gunawan, et al 2015). Sufitrayati (2015) states that earnings management is an ability to manipulate the options available and make the right choices to achieve the desired level of profit.

Earnings management occurs when financial information is modified to the decisions of stakeholders (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Manipulative practices are facilitated by adopting accounting policies, and in making required estimates.

2.4. Tax Avoidance

The purported growth in corporate tax avoidance activity has given rise to two alternative perspectives on the motivations and effects of this activity. Several studies investigate corporate tax

avoidance as an extension of other tax-favoured activity, such as the use of debt. the traditional view of corporate tax avoidance suggests that shareholder value should increase with tax avoidance activity, the alternative view provides a more nuanced prediction. Tax aggressiveness action proxied by tax avoidance, can reducing the taxable amount acquired company (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2018). Corporate governance should be an important determinant of the valuation of purported corporate tax savings. While the direct effect of tax avoidance is to increase the after-tax value of the firm. Thus, the net effect on values should be greater for firms with stronger governance institutions.

The theory of corporate tax management deals with the shareholders, management, and the government and the

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potential agency issues that can arise in corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon, 2010). The first approach relies on the Effective Tax Rate (ETR). The Effective Tax Rate is basically the average tax rate of a tax liability by a measure of tax liability by a measure of pre-tax income.

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Effective Tax Rate	=	the measure of tax liability
		the measure of pre-tax income

2.5. Company Size

Company size is a classification based on the amount of a company asset has. Assets are assessed to have a level of stability in large, medium, or small companies. The calculation of firm size is done by means of Ln total assets owned by the company. Large companies are more sustainable. (Darmawan & Sukartha, 2014). Company size is a factor to classify an entity to tend to utilize its resources rather than using debt financing. Large companies will become the government's spotlight, so it will create a tendency for corporate managers to behave aggressively or obediently (Asri & Suardana, 2016).

Relationship with earnings management because firm size uses total assets as a measuring tool, thus indicating that the company may not necessarily minimize the possibility of earnings management, because large companies have more assets that are not managed properly so that the possibility of errors in expressing the total assets in the company (Gunawan, et al, 2015).

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Size	=	Ln (Total Assets)

2.6. Corporate Governance

In Indonesia, the concept of corporate governance is much discussed since the Asian crisis that occurred in mid-1997 (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2017). Many argue that the crisis was caused by the weak corporate governance that applies to companies in Indonesia. To establish an effective supervisory and control system within a company there are two parties required: independent commissioners and audit committees. So, the variable of corporate governance in this research take the proxy of independent commissioner and audit committee.

Independent commissioners are responsible parties to encourage the implementation of good corporate governance principles within the company through the empowerment of the board of commissioners in order to perform the task of supervising and giving advice to managers effectively and more value-added for the company (Sulistyanto, 2014). The composition of the independent board of commissioners is measured using a ratio scale, i.e. the percentage of the number of independent board of commissioners with the total number of boards of commissioners.

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1. The composition of an independent board of commissioner	=	The number of boards of independent commissioner
		Total number of board of commissioners

Audit Committee is a party who has the duty to assist the commissioner in order to improve the quality of the financial report and increase the effectiveness of internal and external audit (Sulistyanto, 2014). The audit committee is an additional committee established by the board of commissioners to assist in monitoring the management of the company in the preparation of the financial statements and providing views on. The Indonesian audit committee's association defines the audit committee as a committee that works professionally and independently formed by the board of commissioners, then its duty to assist and strengthen the function of the board of commissioners in carrying out oversight functions on the financial reporting process, risk management, audit implementation, and Implementation of corporate governance in companies (Effendi, 2016). The independent audit committee is measured using a ratio scale by measuring the percentage of the total independent audit committee with the total number of the audit committee.

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the independent audit committee	=	the total independent audit committee
		total number of the audit committee

1.7. Return on Assets (ROA)

ROA is one form of the profitability ratio to measure a company's ability to generate profits by using the total assets of the existing and after the capital costs (fees used to finance the assets) are excluded from the analysis (Kabo, 2011). ROA in high company, then the company has the ability to generate profits (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2017). ROA is calculated using the following formula:

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Return on Assets	=	Net Profit After Tax
		Total Assets

ROA shows that the total assets used for the company's operations are able to provide profit for the company. Conversely, if negative ROA shows the total assets used do not provide profit/loss (Kabo, 2011). ROA relationship with earnings management due to high profitability will make the practice of earnings management to be able to do tax avoidance.

3. Research Hypotheses

Based on the formulation of the problem, the theoretical basis and the framework above, it can be arranged hypothesis (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2014) of Performance and Corporate Governance to Earnings Management with tax Avoidance as an intervening variable, as follows:

H_1: Size of the company influence on tax avoidance.

H_2: Independent commissioners' effect on tax avoidance.

H_3: The audit committees' effect on tax avoidance.

H_4: ROA effects on tax avoidance.

H_5: Size of the company effects on earnings management.

H_6: Independent commissioners' effect on earnings management.

H_7: Audit committees' effect on earnings management.

H_8: ROA effects on earnings management.

H_9: Tax avoidance effects on earnings management.

H_{10}: Size of the company affects earnings management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable.

H_{11}: Independent commissioners influence earnings management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable.

H_{12}: Audit committees affect earnings management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable.

H_{13}: ROA affects earnings management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable.

4. Research Methods

Based on the conceptual framework and development, the EM. The relationship between the two is the Tax Avoidance directly affects the EM, while the third link is the application of CG and the performance of the EM avatar indirect effect on EM through the tax avoidance. Fourth reviews these relationships can't be estimated separately because those relationships are intertwined if the relationship is in the estimate separately the results of the estimate will be biased (Mulya, Ali Sandy, 2017)

This study design using quantitative methods, and testing hypotheses by using structural equation modelling with AMOS 24.

4.1. Population, Sample and Research Methods

The population used in this research are companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) manufacturing industry in 2013-2015. The reason is that many enterprises sector is under significant progress, it is evident from the many listed companies in this sector are entered on the list of companies that excel at the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Moreover, another fact to mention that there are still many companies in the sector that are late in submitting annual financial statements.

4.2. Structural Equation formed

Testing model H_1

H_1: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_1$Size + €

Testing model H_2

H_2: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_2$Incom + €

Testing model H_3

H_3: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_3$Acom + €

Testing model$_4$

H_4: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_4$ROA + €

Testing model H_5

H_5: EM = $\alpha + \beta X_1$ Size + €

Testing model H_6

H_6: EM = $\alpha + \beta_2$ Incom + €

Testing model H_7

H_7: EM = $\alpha + \beta_3$ Acom + €

Testing model H_8

H_8: EM = $\alpha + \beta_4$ ROA + €

Testing model H_9

H_9: EM = $\alpha + \beta_5$Tax Avoid + €

Testing model H_{10}

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H_{10}: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Size + $€_1$

EM = $\alpha + \beta_5$Tax Avoid + €

Testing model H_{11}

H_{11}: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_2$ Incom + €

EM = $\alpha + \beta_5$Tax Avoid + €

Testing model H_{12}

H_{12}: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_3$ AuditCom + €

EM = $\alpha + \beta_5$Tax Avoid + €

Testing model H_{13}

H_{13}: Tax Avoid = $\alpha + \beta_4$ ROA + $€_1$

EM = $\alpha + \beta_5$Tax Avoid + €

Description:

Tax Avoid = Tax Avoidance
EM = Earnings Management
Incom = Independent Commissioners
Acom = Audit Committees
ROA = Return on Assets

5. Results of Research

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Table 1: Hypothesis Testing and Discussion on Compliance Test(Good-of-Fit)

Good of fit	Cut off value	test results models	Description
Chi – Square	≤ 21,026; Df 12, sig. 5%	19,943	Good
CMIN/DF	≤ 2,00	2,124	Marginal
RMSEA	0,05 – 0,08	0,071	Good
TLI	≥ 0,90	0,948	Good
NFI	≥ 0,90	0,946	Good
PNFI	0,60 – 0,90	0,861	Good

Chi-Square 19,943 states good because ≤ 21,026; Df 12, sig. 5%, CMIN / DF 2,124 states marginal because of this ratio> 2, RMSEA 0,071 states good because among 0.05-0.08 is an acceptable size, TLI 0.948 states good because ≥ 0.90, NFI 0.946 states good because ≥ 0.90, and PNFI 0.861 states good because the PNFI value between 0.60 to 0.90 indicates a significant difference. The results showed that half of the criteria used had good value (although there were still some under-standard modeling requirements, the value was the closest to the standard).

5.1. Path Analysis

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The results of research testing on the effect of firm size, corporate governance and ROA on earnings management with tax avoidance as an intervening variable with empirical studies on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2013-2015.

Figure 1: Line diagram model with AMOS

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

Source : AMOS Output

Means & Variance
=== Appendix 1 & 2 ===

Diagram model path with AMOS 24 can be made clear by looking at regression weight giving the value of unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients. CR is equal to the value of t-table on the OLS regression and P-probability significance level with *** means by significant defaults at 0.005.

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Table 2: Regression Weight

			2. Estimate	3. SE	4. CR	5. P
6. Tax Avoid	7. <----	8. Size	9. -.048	10. .019	11.2,519	12.***
13. Avoid Tax	14.---	15. Incom	16. -.163	17. <.321	18.2,969	19.***
20.TaxAvoid	21.<----	22. Acom	23. -.024	24. .084	25. 2983	26.***
27. Avoid Tax	28.<----	29. ROA	30. .667	31. .360	32. 4850	33.***
34. EM	35.<----	36. Size	37. .000	38. .002	39. 3983	40.***
41. EM	42.<----	43. Incom	44. .014	45. .026	46. 4622	47.***
48. EM	49.<- -	50. Acom	51. .004	52. .007	53.3.850	54.***
55. EM	56.<----	57. ROA	58. -.012	59. .029	60.2,418	61.***
62. EM	63.<----	64. Tax Avoid	65. .000	66. .004	67.1,269	68..096

Results of research on the effects hypothetical performance (size & ROA) and corporate governance (independent commissioners & audit committees) to earnings management through tax avoidance as intervening variables with empirical studies on manufacturing companies registered in IDX period 2013-2015, can be seen in Appendix 3

6. Conclusion, Implications Research.

6.1. Conclusion

The result is a significant direct effect of the size and returns on assets proxied with the performance against earnings management with CR (3,983 and 2,418) is greater than t-table (1.96). Another direct result is a significant effect of independent commissioners and audit committees with corporate governance proxied against earnings management with CR or t-Statistics (4.622 and 3.850) is greater than t-table (1.96). While the indirect effect, the results are not significant performance and CG against earning management through tax avoidance as an intervening variable with CR or t-Statistics (1,269) is greater than t-table (1.96). Please see appendix 3.

6.2. Implications

A Possibility of companies experiencing an increase in total assets and productivity compared to last year. so, the level of tax evasion of a company will be lower. The company does not use the resources owned by the company to manage its taxes, as the company is likely to be in the spotlight and the government's decision goals so that many of the company's own restrictions to minimize tax evasion.

Tightening supervision well so that it has an effect to minimize tax avoidance. Independent commissioners are very influential, the greater the proportion of independent commissioners the stricter the supervision.

The existence of an audit committee within the company embodies quality *good corporate governance* within the company so as to minimize the occurrence of tax avoidance opportunities by the company.

The implications are important for tax policy advisors, auditors and stakeholders to be aware of the close relationship between performance and corporate governance with earnings management and tax planning considerations and reporting earnings in their monitoring, analysis and policy advice activities.

Ethical clearance - Not required

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Source of funding- Self

Conflict of Interest - Nil

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